information about Fukushima published in English in Japanese media info publiée en anglais dans la presse japonaise
7 Décembre 2014
December 7, 2014
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201412070011
By MASATO TAINAKA/ Staff Writer
The third international conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons will be held in Vienna, starting Dec. 8. The U.S. decision to attend is seen as vital to promoting nuclear disarmament.
William C. Potter, director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, says the United States--which host Austria regards as key to making the conference a success--made "the right decision" now that a majority of countries endorse more action with respect to the humanitarian consequences of using nuclear weapons.
Excerpts from the interview follow:
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Question: I interviewed Austrian Ambassador of Disarmament Alexander Kmentt when he visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August. He indicated that if the United States joined Vienna, it would be a success. But he carefully avoided my question about the Nuclear Weapons Convention and a legally binding framework, which was discussed and concluded in the chair’s summary in the previous Mexico “humanitarian” Conference in February. So, what is the implication of this?
William C. Potter: What I do know is that Kmentt and the Austrian Foreign Ministry tried to be as encouraging as possible, to all parties, including the United States, and so I think the Americans felt that they were being given due consideration, that their concerns about the agenda were addressed, and ultimately, I think, they decided that it was better to be at the table rather than not, particularly following--if you just do the numerical count--at the United Nations General Assembly First Committee meeting in October, where 155 countries joined the New Zealand statement, and another 20 joined the Australian statement. You know, that’s more than 170 countries! There are not that many more countries in the world!
So, it’s clear that the overwhelming majority of states endorse more action with respect to humanitarian consequences.
But I think the argument I have made, that the United States should not be afraid of the issues that are being discussed and is in fact also very concerned about many of these issues as they serve U.S. national interests, particularly as they are to be addressed at the 2015 U.N. NPT Review Conference, means that it is one of those nuclear weapons states that shows that it can participate in a conference dealing with the question of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
If the French and the Russians don’t want to attend the Vienna conference, let them stick their necks out and get hammered by the non-nuclear weapons states. But, there’s no reason for the U.S. to join that kind of a coalition. I mean, the remnants of the P5 (five nuclear powers under the NPT comprises the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) solidarity are hard to find at the moment, and so while, in 2013, when the U.S. might have still hoped for some follow-on, bilateral, nuclear negotiations, it didn’t want to antagonize the Russians over their participation; today, there’s no such hope.
Q: To get back to what Kmentt said actually, that it would be in the U.S. interest to join the conference. Probably it is from the high moral ground.
A: Well, it’s not the high moral ground. I don’t think it’s just the high moral ground. Let me state this in a different sort of way. The United States makes the case to all relevant parties in the Middle East that they should not be afraid of participating in consultations dealing with a WMD-free zone in the Middle East (which were agreed upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, but have yet to be held), and that they should all participate in those consultations because it’s in their interest to be at the table.
I think that’s a very compelling argument, but if it applies to parties in the Middle East with respect to the WMD-free zone, it also applies to the nuclear weapons states with respect to humanitarian consequences. So I think, generally, boycotts don’t work. They are counter-productive, and you’re better to be at the negotiating table. It’s not really a “negotiating” forum. But you can influence the discussion. You can influence the conclusions that are drawn. And, for that reason, I think the United States made the right decision.
Q: The U.S. State Department announced that it will not join the debate on disarmament in Vienna, and also Kmentt avoided being drawn on this item on the agenda. But under the general debate, countries can argue anything, including the NWC. So, how do they deal with it, the U.S.?
A: You know, debate, I think, is probably--well, who knows what will happen? I mean, I have attended one of these meetings in the past in Mexico. Much of it, they were kind of scholarly and scientific presentations. There was not a great deal of debate; there were various interventions when states had a chance and NGOs had a chance to speak.
I think, unfortunately, at the last meeting the chair did not adequately or accurately capture what had been agreed upon, or suggested things that were agreed upon, which had really not been. I don’t think it accurately reflected the discussion. I have lots of friends on the Mexican side, but I just don’t think it was a helpful chair summary.
And the Americans, I think, will work hard to make sure that nothing like that happens in Vienna. I know the Austrian team well and they’re very professional, and I think that they will not misrepresent the discussion that takes place. It’s not going to be a negotiation.
The big question in my mind is not what happens in Vienna, because Vienna is not the end of this process; it’s what happens following Vienna. How does the issue that will be addressed at Vienna flow into the U.N. NPT Review Conference, beginning in April next year? And how does the Review Conference capture the strong support that almost certainly will be expressed in Vienna? And where does it go from there? What happens next?
So, there’s been some talk about South Africa possibly hosting a conference of humanitarian consequences. But, at some point, you are going to have to address the really difficult issues and that is “Where does this concern about humanitarian impact--how does that impact on different negotiations?”
The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is not going anywhere. The nuclear weapons states certainly don’t want any negotiation outside of Geneva. It’s not clear that you’ll be able to forge consensus on anything, at the next Review Conference, for a variety of reasons. This will be a major issue but not the only major issue.
So, there’s a real question of what will happen. And there are going to be some states, probably a lot of states, that would like to push for a ban treaty. There will be others that will want to talk about a nuclear weapons convention. There will be others that will argue that a building block approach needs to be pursued.
Q: Yes. Japan promotes a building block approach.
A: Well, Japan among others. But, it’s not clear how these countries will divide up and what kind of a path forward they will chart. This road map, where does it go?
So I think, actually, one of the more interesting approaches would be for countries to take quite seriously the proposal made on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (the NAC comprises Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt and Brazil), at the last NPT prepcom in April, which looks at a variety of approaches that need to be considered, without recommending--there are four basic approaches, one of which is “other”--four basic approaches that are recommended for consideration, and they don’t rule out alternatives. And I think that kind of an examination could be useful.
Q: I see. I covered the 2000 NPT Review Conference and I recall that the NAC was very, very powerful. It was successful in achieving “an unequivocal undertaking” of nuclear disarmament from the five nuclear powers. So, will the NAC return to the NPT? I mean, as a powerful force.
A: Well, the NAC hasn’t disappeared. I think that it probably will be more pronounced in 2015 than it has been for quite some time. But whether it will be able to serve in this bridge-building capacity is another question.
The environment is difficult, but the environment was difficult in 2000 also. We had, then, the ABM Treaty issue that was the big issue.
So, the NAC may play a role. The NPDI (Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative; comprises 12 non-nuclear weapon countries including Japan) could be helpful--although it doesn’t really bridge the political groupings in the same fashion that the New Agenda Coalition does. But it’s also going to be a question of how flexible states are, and there are other wild cards. I mean, it’s not just the Middle East. It’s not just humanitarian consequences.
I would be surprised if Ukraine doesn’t play a major role. I was actually surprised that it didn’t play a greater role at the prepcom, but there was still the hope for some kind of accommodation. But, it could spill over in all different kinds of ways, whether on a discussion of security assurance, the Budapest Memorandum, nuclear security, nuclear safety or the whole debate over nuclear alliances. All of these things may come up. Plus, it is a very emotional issue. So, personalities matter and they can blow up.
So, I’m not sure how countries will respond in the debate.
Q: I would like to ask about Japan’s ambivalent position, as a U.S. ally. Japan, as you know, supported both the New Zealand and Australian joint statements with regard to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at the U.N. General Assembly First Committee in October.
A: The only other country to do so, I think, was Finland.
Q: Tokyo supports Washington’s “step-by-step” approach or gradual nuclear disarmament. Also, Tokyo must take care of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki agenda of humanitarian discourse. So, what would you recommend to the Japanese Foreign Ministry in terms of managing the whole agenda to promote nuclear disarmament in the coming Vienna and New York or the U.N. NPT Review Conference next year?
A: I think it appears very odd for the only country that actually experienced, directly, nuclear weapons use to be indecisive in terms of the initiative that they support here.
To go back to the question about what to advise your foreign minister, I think that Japan could confidently support the New Zealand language (which focused on the humanitarian aspect rather than security aspect), because to support both is to, basically, highlight the fact that you’re undecided yourself, and it sends, I think, the wrong signal. I think you would be better off supporting one or the other. To support both I don’t think really shows clarity of thought.
And I can make the argument as a Japanese diplomat which of the two that I might prefer.
I think that one can gain the assurances that you want from the United States, without regard to the initiatives that you support here, and so my own view is that the strongest measures of assurance with respect to alliances have very little to do with nuclear assurances, and with the presence of nuclear weapons. I’m less concerned about what the Japanese or any other American ally says or does with respect to the humanitarian consequence issues, and the credibility of the nuclear umbrella than other factors.
But I know it’s a difficult and a highly politically-charged issue, and I don’t have much confidence that Japan is going to change its position any time soon. You can make arguments on both sides of that. I don’t think whatever the Japanese do on that issue is going to have much effect, in terms of the relationship between Japan and the United States. It will be determined by other considerations.
Q: But do you think that this humanitarian discourse or initiative will provide more momentum to promote nuclear disarmament, or become a stumbling block?
A: Well, the problem is you can only have so many humanitarian consequences conferences. It has to lead someplace. I have been pleased that it has generated greater support among civil society and the NGO world, and I think that’s a good thing. I think shining the spotlight on this issue sometimes can encourage states to act.
I think, also, the issue becomes even more important, given the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations. In the previous Mexico meeting in February, one of the most interesting issues discussed was with these near-misses. You know, where these were not technical malfunctions but political miscalculations, we came precariously close to unintended use of nuclear weapons.
And the potential, I think, for those miscalculations and mistakes grows exponentially with the nosedive in U.S.-Russian relations. The Russians are now becoming far more assertive in their flights over or close to U.S. and NATO territory. We are engaged in various military maneuvers that the Russians regard as provocative. We also have this same situation with the Chinese.
So, the probability of a mistake just grows. The more that we conduct these exercises, and the more we are, probably, inclined to infer intent from what may be an accident. So, I worry a lot about this, and I think focusing on the consequences of these mistakes is very important at this moment in time.
Q: Right. That’s what Kmentt said, that he would discuss it, in Vienna. One more question about human discourse and President Barack Obama. We witnessed the historical defeat in the midterm election. I didn’t see anybody wearing the “Yes we can” T-shirt in the United States recently. But, Japanese, and especially Hiroshima and Nagasaki people, still hope Obama will do something for nuclear disarmament.
A: Right.
Q: Remembering the Prague speech. Would you see any possibility that Obama will visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the remainder of his tenure, over the next two years?
A: I can’t anticipate that. I think it would be a good idea. Personally, had someone asked me, I would have recommended that President Obama fly to Japan after the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident. I think that gesture would have been far more powerful than any nuclear promises. That is, nuclear alliance promises. To show that we are, kind of, “with you.” So, I don’t discount the symbolic importance of his travel there.
My view is that, strange as it may seem to some, I don’t think we’re ever going to find an administration that is more sympathetic to nuclear disarmament. I don’t think any president is going to be as committed to this as President Obama, and with the folks that he has at Defense and at State, it’s going to be very difficult to find a team that’s more committed.
But, the president finds himself in a very difficult international and domestic political environment, where you have a Congress that opposes everything that he does, and an international environment that’s not much more encouraging.
You know, up until the crisis over the Russian annexation of Crimea and the like, I actually was hopeful that, perhaps, one would see some positive movement on the nuclear disarmament front, through concerns that were of a bipartisan nature about the defense budget. So, I thought that there might be some changes in nuclear force posture and nuclear strategy. I’m not really that interested, personally, in the numbers, but I think it’s questions of the conditions of use. You know, the force posture.
And you saw some signs of even fiscally conservative Republicans joining Democrats on this issue. Unfortunately, after Ukraine, all of that is, I think, just wishful thinking.
Q: Some people in Washington, I mean scientists, have suggested that Obama could decide about the hair trigger alert with ICBMs. He could shut those facilities without any cooperation from the Republicans.
A: There are some things that can be done. I mean, the dealerting issue is one of those areas.
I was actually thinking more in terms of a more significant change in the force posture. I mean, there had been--we produced a study on the so-called “trillion-dollar budget,” which has received a lot of attention. And it was an attempt to look at the amount of money that was likely to be spent for force modernization. And when we did this study at the end of last year, it really looked as if this might have some traction. But right now it doesn’t look very encouraging.
But, you know, I think this is an area where the president may decide to act more unilaterally, because he doesn’t have a lot to lose at the moment. Although there will be those who are concerned about this being a bad issue for the Democrats. But, let’s see.
And Iran will be ... very consequential (about) what happens here ...
That’s a big risk for him too, but it doesn’t just require the president. I think that you have a situation, now, where the negotiators, led by the Iranian foreign minister, would like a deal. The problem is how do they sell it to their political constituents, bosses, and then how we sell it to the U.S. Congress. That’s going to be the hard sell.
Q: That’s the arms control side. But, with regard to Japan, it pays more attention to the humanitarian discourse, as well as the reconciliation aspect between the U.S. and Japan.
A: Right.
Q: 2015 will mark the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Don't you think that it’s time for the U.S. to discuss this discourse? Already 20 years have passed since 1995 when the Smithsonian proposed putting the Enola Gay on display, but it didn’t happen. Since then, more and more veterans and hibakusha have passed away. Surely it’s time for Americans and Japanese to calmly discuss this issue?
A: I mean, the problem, again, is that everything in Washington is so politicized. I just don’t have a very well-informed view.
So, the one other issue that I really wanted to address, where I’ve worked most closely with Japan, has to do with disarmament and nonproliferation education. And, in fact, the whole initiative, both in the NPT context and the U.N. context, came out of a set of recommendations made by the secretary-general’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Affairs. And I was the author of the study that was subsequently the basis for the U.N. General Assembly resolution.
So, I think an area where there is a potential for Japan to do more and also to engage more closely with the U.S. in a fashion that would promote both sides’ interest in disarmament, and nonproliferation, that’s with respect to education and training.
And the problem has been that it’s been very difficult to get the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to join in various resolutions and working papers that have been discussed in the NPT context. So, I would hope that this would be an issue that would receive more attention by the U.S. government. But I think in order for that to happen, Japan will also have to engage with the Americans.
And one of my concerns is that this has tended to be--this maybe is too esoteric--but it has tended to be worked on in Geneva, and it needs to be more focused on Washington and Tokyo.
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Dr. William Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar professor of Nonproliferation Studies and director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He has served on numerous committees of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and for five years was a member of the U.N. secretary-general’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.
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