information about Fukushima published in English in Japanese media info publiée en anglais dans la presse japonaise
2 Août 2015
August 1, 2015
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20150801p2a00m0na008000c.html
A judicial review board's July 31 announcement that three former Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) executives should be indicted over the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant meltdowns reflects existing "sense among ordinary people," and emphasizes the weight of responsibilities that have been placed on the senior officials of the plant operator.
The Tokyo No. 5 Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution dismissed the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office's decision to drop cases against TEPCO's former chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, 75, and two former vice presidents, Ichiro Takekuro, 69, and Sakae Muto, 65 -- claiming that such a decision neglected the significance of the disaster and was based on a false understanding.
Since the committee is made up of 11 citizens, however, its judgment differs from regular prosecution standards. As such, court-appointed attorneys serving as prosecutors are believed to face difficulties in making a good case -- and lengthy trials are expected.
"The committee's report clearly says that the TEPCO executives could have predicted (the disaster)," commented an attorney from a group of lawyers that filed for a review to the committee on behalf of disaster victims. "We have a bright outlook for the trials."
Perhaps the biggest game-changing factor for the public prosecutors' earlier decision not to indict the three former executives was the committee's conclusion that the responsible parties for a nuclear power plant should take into consideration the possibility of a disaster exceeding all expectations, insofar as a nuclear plant accident would result in irreversible effects.
The report emphasized that the TEPCO executives were responsible for preparing for a possible nuclear disaster at the Fukushima plant even though the chance of such an accident was very small -- thereby imposing much greater due diligence on the former utility executives than had the public prosecutors. The fact that the committee referred to a shutdown of the plant to ensure safety was also a notable point.
In order to hold someone criminally liable in cases of negligence, prosecutors must prove that the defendant could predict an accident and avoid its consequences. In the TEPCO case, the utility's 2008 calculation based on projection by a government earthquake research body -- wherein the highest tsunami waves hitting south of the Fukushima plant were estimated to be 15.7 meters -- drew significant attention. The focal point in the case was whether the utility executives acknowledged this estimate and were able to predict the massive tsunami.
The Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office had concluded that prior to the disaster, the officials could not have recognized the tsunami risk whereby the plant's main equipment would become submerged in water. The office claimed that the scale of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami had exceeded the projection by the government research body, and that the projection itself had low credibility.
In response to the public prosecutors' argument, the committee cited the 1986 Chernobyl disaster -- pointing out that a nuclear plant accident could discharge a huge amount of radioactive materials that would in turn affect the preservation of humanity. It went on to say that parties involved in the operation of nuclear power plants "absolutely cannot ignore" estimates for the highest tsunami, and concluded specifically that the three executives could have predicted the disaster.
Regarding the avoidance of consequences, the committee argued that the executives should have taken every measure possible -- including the suspension of plant operation -- at least during a period when the utility was working on establishing appropriate tsunami prevention measures. "If the operation had been suspended, the disaster could have been avoided," the report said.
The committee slammed the conclusion wherein the public prosecutors had said that the nuclear accident was unpredictable, and that it could not have been avoided even with waterproof buildings or moving the plant up on higher ground. This was deemed as having "no persuasiveness," and it was concluded that the decision had been "based on a false understanding."
Meanwhile, the executives are facing a class-action suit filed by a group of TEPCO shareholders with the Tokyo District Court, in which the investors are demanding a total of some 5.5 trillion yen from the three, as well as from 24 other former and current TEPCO executives. The 15.7-meter tsunami estimate has also become the point of contention in this lawsuit, with the defendant claiming that the figure was scientifically groundless.
In the criminal trial, which will start as the three executives are facing mandatory prosecution, the largest points of contention will likely be the scientific credibility of the estimate for tsunami -- as well as how such information was passed to the defendants. Since court-appointed attorneys serving as prosecutors are allowed to conduct supplementary investigations for mandatory prosecution, they will likely consider interviewing earthquake and tsunami experts, as well as TEPCO employees who were involved in the calculation process.
A number of witnesses are expected to be summoned if the defendants plead not guilty, however, resulting in a prolonged trial.
August 1, 2015
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20150801p2a00m0na009000c.html
A prosecution inquest panel concluded that the responsibility of former Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) executives who failed to take measures to prevent a nuclear accident at its tsunami-hit Fukushima nuclear plant should be clarified through a criminal trial.
The Tokyo No. 5 Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution recommended that former TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and two former vice presidents, Sakae Muto and Ichiro Takekuro, be prosecuted on charges of professional negligence resulting in death and injury. This was the second recommendation by the prosecution inquest panel, whose eleven members were selected from among members of the general public.
In 2008, three years before the disaster, TEPCO released its estimate that the atomic power plant could be hit by a tsunami up to 15.7 meters in height. The inquest panel determined that the three former executives failed to take necessary measures, and neglected their duty to prevent a serious accident, even though they knew of this possibility.
The panel's decision stated repeatedly that if a nuclear accident were to occur, it could be a serious disaster -- a position that is completely understandable.
The decision says that in operating nuclear plants, top priority should be placed on safety measures rather than reducing expenses. Citing nuclear plant accidents overseas, the decision emphasizes that TEPCO should have taken sufficient measures to protect the power station from tsunami, even though such disasters are extremely rare.
Even so, the point of contention in proving that the three committed professional negligence is whether or not they could have predicted and prevented the disaster. The panel's decision takes seriously the responsibility of the three as the top-ranking executives of the utility that operates the Fukushima plant. The decision recognizes that the executives had been informed regarding the company's forecast that a higher tsunami than previously estimated could possibly hit the power station -- and concludes that they could have implemented countermeasures as a result.
Prosecutors who had decided not to indict the three had deemed that they could not have specifically predicted the risks of tsunami hitting the plant because of the forecast's lack of reliability. However, the inquest panel dismissed this conclusion as unconvincing.
A court will judge whether the three have criminal responsibility for the nuclear disaster. However, it is of great significance that those representing citizens have concluded twice that the three should be brought to justice.
Several years have passed since the executive and legislative branches' investigative committees on the nuclear crisis were disbanded. Only part of TEPCO insiders' testimonies on the accident has been disclosed.
As such, many people who have been affected by the nuclear crisis are wondering why the accident was not prevented.
Even though the trial of the three former TEPCO executives is not aimed at clarifying the cause of the accident, it is hoped that testimonies provided by the three, as well as from witnesses, will help answer the many questions from disaster victims. During the hearings, moreover, the executives should sincerely describe the roles that they played in managing the utility.
The prosecution inquest panel's decision was in response to a criminal complaint filed by long-term Fukushima evacuees, including one who died during hospitalization. Many victims will pay close attention to the court proceedings, and the responsibility of court-appointed lawyers -- who will act as prosecutors during the trial -- is extremely heavy. Prosecutors should fully cooperate with the lawyers during the trial proceedings.
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