Damning report

Fukushima disaster caused by human error that could have been prevented: gov't panel

http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120723p2a00m0na037000c.html

A final report released July 23 by a government panel investigating the ongoing nuclear crisis in Fukushima has concluded that the disaster could have been prevented.

The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company zeroed in not only on the missteps of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the operator of the stricken Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, and the Japanese government following the onset of the nuclear disaster, but also on pre-disaster efforts and the organizational and societal backdrop against which the disaster broke out.

What has emerged, as a result, is the conclusion that the disaster was not caused by tsunami of unanticipated proportions, but by human error.

The committee placed its emphasis not on pinpointing who is responsible for the disaster, but on preventing future incidents to draw out honest testimony from those involved. Because of this, the panel's final report differs from that of the Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), in that it refrains from using the term "jinsai," or man-made calamity.

Other phrasing in the report also betrayed the panel's cautiousness, including: "It is difficult to assess whether the hydrogen explosions could have been prevented if the cooling capacity of reactors had been restored at an earlier time."

Despite such circumspect language, however, in bringing up the plant's bungled operation and the administration's botched initial handling of the crisis, the report hints at the likelihood that much of the damage could have been prevented if the main players had acted differently.

The report elaborates upon the fact that TEPCO officials had failed to take precautionary measures even though they had been aware of the possibility of massive tsunami hitting the plant. But such a pre-disaster approach was not limited to TEPCO. It extended to the way nuclear regulatory bodies took -- or failed to take -- on their roles.

In June 1993, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) compiled a report on station blackout (SBO), which refers to a state in which a nuclear plant has lost power. However, according to the investigative panel's findings, the report had been based on a write-up by TEPCO on why a long-term SBO was implausible, a document the NSC itself had requested.

The panel viewed this as problematic, stating in the report: "While the NSC did not completely copy off of TEPCO's response (to its request), the content remains similar. Requesting a document from a power company was inappropriate action for a regulatory body to take."

In January 2009, the NSC held a meeting on accident management for the No. 3 reactor at Hokkaido Electric Power Co.'s Tomari Nuclear Power Plant. The NSC stated the importance of considering "external phenomena (such as earthquakes and tsunami)," and noted in reference materials distributed at the meeting that accident preparedness should be based on the possible effects of major quakes, as well as the composite damage that could result from quakes and fires.

However, the topic was not discussed at the meeting, nor was it addressed at a later date. In his testimony to the government investigation panel, then-NSC head Atsuyuki Suzuki said that "the task would've been gargantuan and impossible to bring under control," and that "it's true that the implementation of international methods was put off."

Following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in 2002, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ordered all U.S. nuclear plants to reinforce their safety measures and prepare against possible terrorist attacks. In 2007, the NRC announced a similar regulation requiring plants to ensure cooling capabilities in the case of aircraft crashes.

Officials with the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) visited the NRC in 2008, where they exchanged views on aircraft crashes on nuclear plants with their U.S. counterparts. Between 2009 and 2010, NISA deliberated its policy on the issue within the agency, and in January 2011, decided to discuss the issue further with additional counsel from the NRC.

A NISA official told the government investigation panel that such developments were not reflected in NISA's regulation of the nuclear industry because "since terrorism in Japan was less likely than in the U.S., it couldn't be helped that things would progress at a slower pace," and that "the effectiveness of the measures were unclear."

Meanwhile, the reactivation of two reactors at the Oi Nuclear Power Plant this month brought Japan's non-nuclear period to an end after two months. Both the government and power companies say they've taken the measures necessary to prevent a crisis similar to the one still unfolding in Fukushima. However, the Oi restarts have taken place before completion of probes into the slapdash manner in which fault screenings were conducted where nuclear plants currently stand, and before the Oi plant's quake-proof administrative buildings -- which would serve as command and restoration headquarters in the case of an accident -- were ready for operations.