NRA requirements are missing important issues

March 10, 2014

EDITORIAL: Nuclear watchdog should continue with reforms reflecting lessons from Fukushima

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201403100058 

Nuclear power plants in Japan are going through a safety review by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), which they must pass to resume their operations. The review process is now approaching its first crucial stage.

The NRA has made progress in narrowing the list of reactors that are likely to meet the new safety standards, and so the nuclear watchdog expects to announce soon the power plants that will be given “priority screening” for a restart.

Politicians eager for restarts tend to call the nation’s new safety regulations “the world’s most stringent.” They sound as if no problems will remain with Japan’s nuclear power plants as long as the safety standards are met.

However, that is not the case.

There are major outstanding issues that are not included in the NRA’s regulatory requirements, such as drawing up evacuation plans by local governments in the vicinity of the plants to prepare for a contingency and finding sites to store spent nuclear fuel for many years. On top of that, the NRA’s safety review process itself is still in the middle of reform.

The NRA’s screening has not yet fully incorporated lessons learned from the disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. For example, it does not address such a serious issue as the concentration of many reactors in a relatively narrow area.

CONCENTRATION OF REACTORS NOT ADDRESSED

Let us remind ourselves that the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant released massive amounts of radioactive materials after reactors Nos. 1-3 went into meltdown in rapid succession three years ago.

The whole of Japan was plunged into endless terror, not knowing how serious the accident would be.

If reactor No. 4’s spent fuel pool overheated, significantly destroying the spent fuel rods, there was a danger that no one would be able to go near the plant to contain the crisis due to alarming levels of radioactive contamination.

If that had occurred, it was possible that reactors No. 5 and No. 6, which were shut down at the time, as well as the four reactors at the Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant, located only 12 kilometers away, might have also been crippled. In other words, up to 10 reactors at the plants might have released radioactive substances.

This “worst case scenario” was avoided, only due to the fervent efforts by workers at the plants, as well as a stroke of luck that a massive amount of water gushed into reactor No. 4’s spent fuel pool.

Still, the accident sent shock waves through nuclear regulators around the world. Light water reactors, the type most commonly used around the globe, were damaged so severely that they released huge amounts of radiation. In addition, the regulators were made to realize the potential risks of spent fuel pools and building reactors being located in close proximity to each other.

After the Fukushima accident, many countries, including Japan, re-examined their emergency responses to nuclear accidents resulting from natural disasters and began to ask nuclear power operators to come up with countermeasures to deal with a scenario of simultaneous multiple nuclear accidents.

Japan’s nuclear power plants tend to be clustered too close together in narrow areas, far closer than the widespread distribution of nuclear plants in other countries.

The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant in Niigata Prefecture has seven reactors. Within Fukui Prefecture, there are 14 reactors, including one prototype fast-breeder reactor. In light of this concentration of reactors, the NRA’s regulation is too mild.

“We are aware of a need to discuss this issue, but have not done it yet,” NRA Chairman Shunichi Tanaka said. It seems this is because the NRA believes it will be some time until multiple reactors start to operate simultaneously at one site.

However, nuclear plants containing fuel rods are potentially dangerous even if they are not online. Even if only one reactor is running, as long as there are other reactors nearby, there is danger of the damage spreading in the event of an accident. Especially when numerous operators of nuclear power plants are involved, the situation cannot be left in their hands alone.

This is a matter Japan should put a priority on tackling. How does the NRA expect to explain the results of its safety reviews without squarely dealing with the concentration problem?

INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT WARNING

The new regulations have become far more stringent in terms of the equipment that is designed to prepare for natural disasters such as tsunami and earthquakes.

It requires the operator to simulate possible severe accidents and establish a “safety goal” that limits the likelihood of having a core accident at each reactor to once every 10,000 years at most. Under the new requirements, the operator is required to strengthen the structure and equipment of the reactors to that end.

This kind of approach has been adopted widely in the West. In Japan, it was debated for more than a decade, but the “safety myth” of Japanese reactors prevented this from being adopted by nuclear power plant operators.

As far as this numerical safety goal is concerned, Japanese reactors are almost on par with reactors in other countries, but not the best in the world. The operators seem put out at being asked to comply with more requirements in regard to their equipment, but they should consider them the minimum steps in a disaster-prone country such as Japan.

On the other hand, regulation is still weak regarding human factors such as accident response while in operation. Planning against terror attacks only presupposes the possibility of terrorists crashing airplanes into nuclear power plants. A fundamental overhaul is necessary. The NRA should crack down harder, not just inspect the drills, but follow the methods of other countries to conduct on-site, emergency accident or terror attack drills without prior notice.

JAPAN HAS TO CATCH UP FAST

The Fukushima accident occurred under a system of lax regulations that favored the operator. We are a lap behind the Western countries in terms of enforcing stronger regulations, and we need to catch up quickly.

The NRA should make a better effort to explain to the public what it is doing. Granted, the NRA does broadcast its chairman's news conferences and screening meetings via the Internet, but we wonder whether information about its screenings and regulations is reaching the general public. We also urge the NRA to strengthen its involvement in the creation of evacuation programs.

It is also essential that the NRA trains and motivates its staff, who are conducting safety inspections.

The nuclear regulation agency, the NRA's secretariat, absorbed the former Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization （JNES), which resulted in the number of staff expanding to roughly 1,000. JNES used to be responsible for safety reviews prior to the Fukushima accident and was criticized for being “too close” to operators. The new agency must alter this mind-set, maintain a healthy distance when dealing with the operators and improve the quality of the regulatory measures.

To achieve this, the NRA must maintain its independence from the nuclear lobby and ensure that the importance of its regulatory actions is understood by all members of its staff.

The Abe administration and the plant operators are trying to rush into restarts. However, the NRA must at all times maintain a draconian standard for its reviews and constantly seek to improve itself.

--The Asahi Shimbun, March 9