16 Juillet 2012
July 16, 2012
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120715002261.htm
The initial response made by staff at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant following last year's March 11 earthquake and subsequent tsunami was inadequate compared to that by their counterparts at the nearby Fukushima No. 2 nuclear power plant, according to an outline of the final report by a government panel.
The Yomiuri Shimbun obtained the outline of the report, which is scheduled to be released July 23, by the panel charged with investigating the nuclear crisis at the No. 1 plant.
Looking into measures taken at the two plants--both operated by Tokyo Electric Power Co.--following the disaster, the final report will criticize the No. 1 plant for not taking sufficient measures compared to No. 2, which minimized the damage caused by the tsunami.
The final report is also set to refer to delays in evacuating inpatients and others from a hospital near the No. 1 plant following the outbreak of the crisis. It blames a lack of communication between the Fukushima prefectural government and the Self-Defense Forces for the deaths of several dozen patients.
Workers at the No. 1 plant manually shut down the No. 3 reactor's emergency cooling system in the early hours of March 13. Cooling of the reactor remained suspended for more than six hours because they failed to secure an alternative way to inject water.
At the No. 2 reactor, workers did not measure the pressure and temperatures in its pressure suppression pool--which is the lower portion of the reactor's containment vessel--until the early hours of March 14. This failure eventually caused the plant to be unable to lower the pressure in the reactor--a necessary step to inject water.
Meanwhile, the No. 2 plant--about 10 kilometers south of the No. 1 plant--found its sea water pumps and other equipment were damaged after it was hit by tsunami as high as nine meters.
"The No. 2 plant almost suffered the same fate as No. 1," plant chief Naohiro Masuda has recalled. Nonetheless, the plant was able to continue cooling its reactors.
The panel's investigation found that workers at the No. 2 plant confirmed they would be able to take subsequent steps before they changed how they injected water into the reactors. They also kept an eye on the pressure and temperatures of the pressure suppression pools.
One TEPCO employee working there at the time of the disaster told the panel it was "natural" for the plant to take those measures.
"The No. 1 plant's initial responses were less adequate than those by the No. 2 plant, regardless of the fact they faced different situations--such as whether external power supply was available," the final report is set to conclude. It will also call for these lessons to be reflected in reviewing measures to prevent the recurrence of a nuclear crisis.
The panel also examined the deaths of about 40 people at Futaba Hospital in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, following the outbreak of the crisis.
When the hospital evacuated its patients on March 14, the prefectural government's disaster response headquarters failed to secure suitable vehicles to carry bedridden people, forcing the hospital to look for different vehicles.
Moreover, the prefectural government's division for the disabled found institutions that could accept the hospital's patients, but it did not provide this information to the headquarters.
As a result, the hospital's patients were forced to travel more than 200 kilometers from Futaba.
The panel also found the SDF had insufficient communication with the prefectural government, which resulted in it being unable to coordinate with the hospital's director.
To make matters worse, the SDF failed to discover 35 patients in the hospital's annex when it conducted rescue operations on March 15. They were left behind until the early hours of March 16.
The final report is set to conclude that then Prime Minister Naoto Kan confused workers at the No. 1 plant through his intervention, while also saying it was wrong for the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency to deny there had been meltdowns at the plant when it held press conferences during the early days of the crisis.