Report on the handling of the disaster

February 28, 2012

Report takes former PM Kan to task over Fukushima nuke disaster handling

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120228p2a00m0na016000c.html

The office of former Prime Minister Naoto Kan came in for scathing criticism in a Feb. 27 report on the handling of the Fukushima nuclear crisis' opening days, with the document accusing the PM's office of "grandstanding" and causing "useless confusion."

The report, put together by the private Fukushima nuclear disaster independent investigative committee, concludes that the Prime Minister's Office's first response to the meltdowns at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant "increased the risk of worsening the situation through stress and useless confusion." Furthermore, "grandstanding led to badly muddled crisis management measures" which did little or nothing to help prevent a worsening of the disaster. The report also rebuked the highest levels of government for meddling in emergency response measures.

The investigative committee, which began its work in September last year, is made up of six scientists and legal experts. Fukushima No. 1 plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) refused to cooperate with the committee's inquiries.

One focus of the report is the Prime Minister's Office's dispatch of electricity trucks to the No. 1 plant when it lost all power in the March 11, 2011 tsunami, knocking out the reactors' cooling systems. When the trucks arrived, there were no electrical cords to hook them up to the plant.

"That's the point at which we (the government) began to distrust TEPCO," then Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano (now economy, trade and industry minister) is quoted as saying in the report. However, the investigators concluded that government distrust of TEPCO was a factor behind the direct intervention of the PM's Office.

The report also stated that "Orders by the Prime Minister's Office and industry ministry that gas building up in the reactor vessels be vented right away (to reduce pressure) were not at all helpful," citing the loss of power at the plant and the fact that TEPCO was waiting for local residents to be evacuated.

The report also takes Kan to task over the injection of sea water into the No. 1 reactor, stating that he confused the situation and risked making it far worse when, at a meeting at around 6 p.m. on March 12, he "vehemently" expressed worries that the injection would cause the reactor to go critical again and ordered a reappraisal of the planned operation. Fukushima No. 1 plant chief Masao Yoshida, however, began injecting sea water at 7:04 p.m., and ignored orders from both the Prime Minister's Office and TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters to stop.

"Had Yoshida obeyed the order from the Prime Minister's Office, there was a real danger that the operation would have been started too late," the report states. However, it furthermore concludes that the fact Yoshida took action in direct opposition to government and TEPCO orders was "a very serious risk in terms of crisis management."

The report is not entirely damning of Kan's actions, however, stating that his refusal on March 15 to allow TEPCO to abandon the nuclear plant "in the end compelled TEPCO to remain steadfast" as the crisis unfolded.

On the other hand, the report also states that Kan was aware he was making Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan Chairman Haruki Madarame and his Cabinet ministers uncertain about any objections they had to his decisions with his strong, top-down command style and insistence on his own opinions.

Furthermore, as leader, Kan's "self-assertion was a positive in that he could judge the situation and implement countermeasures, but was a negative in that it became a form of psychological control of others involved and caused a withering of their roles in the crisis.

Click here for the original Japanese story 

Panel denounces govt. handling of disaster

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20120228_32.html

An independent panel investigating the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant has criticized the government's responses as ad-hoc, stopgap measures.

A report issued by the panel on Tuesday says then prime minister Naoto Kan and several other lawmakers told the panel that they had no understanding of the nuclear disaster manuals. They said they had received no explanations of the manuals from ministry officials at an early stage of the accident.

The report says Kan first received explanations of the manuals from officials 4 days after the accident, when a joint task force of the government and Tokyo Electric Power Company was set up.

The panel says that just after the accident occurred, staff members at the prime minister's office were busy looking up in books the basics of legislation on nuclear disasters.

Tetsuro Fukuyama was the deputy chief Cabinet secretary at that time. He reportedly said he received no explanations of disaster-related matters from officials during the six months from assuming the post.

Fukuyama told the panel that he was hardly even aware of the functions of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. He said that it was a grave mistake on his part to believe that officials would pass on information soon after they confirmed the situation.

Although receiving little information from the plant operator and the nuclear agency, Kan and other ministers started to be involved in decision-making on the accident. The issues included whether to vent gas from the reactor containment vessels, and to pump sea water to cool the reactors. Manuals say plant operators are responsible for making such decisions.

One of the lawmakers working at the prime minister's office at that time said politicians were only focusing on short-term measures and problems immediately facing them.

The report says Cabinet ministers were busy making off-the-cuff measures without basic awareness of the disaster while receiving poor support from officials.

It recommends that the government review its disaster manuals and the system to seek advice from officials.